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LAW LEARNING, TEACHER-STUDENT
RELATIONS, AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
ROBERT S. REDMOUNT*
And the horrible thing about all legal officials, even the best, about all
judges, magistrates, barristers, detectives and policemen, is not that they
are wicked (some of them are good), not that they are stupid (several of
them are quite intelligent), it is simply that they have gotten used to it.
G.K. Chesterton in TREMENDOUS TRIFLES
I. INTRODUCTION
The lawyer is a product of cultural and professional education who
serves particular social roles through his professional identity and ca-
pacity. In terms of his professional experience, one may ask how he got
to be who and what he is. Further, in terms of his learning experiences
and his roles in society, should he and can he be different? These are
questions addressed in this writing, with particular focus on what and
how the lawyer learns in law school, how teacher-student relations af-
fect his learning, what kind of legal education evolves to produce what
kind of lawyer, and what changes or innovations are needed in legal
education to make better lawyers more appropriately trained to their
social roles and functions. This is a large and almost presumptuous
undertaking. It is narrowed somewhat by a focus throughout on indi-
vidual law student experience and the development of lawyer character
and capacity.
Legal education operates with a number of working assumptions,
most of which give rise to questions about educational policy and prac-
tice. Ultimately, some or many of these working assumptions reflect on
the question of what a lawyer is, what he does, and what type of lawyer
is best. There can be parochial and technical answers to such ques-
tions, but the need for perspective on the lawyer in society suggests that
it might be salutary to examine the lawyer in the context of philosophi-
cal and historical models of man. This, then, may be translated into
* B.A., 1943, M.S., 1947, Pennsylvania State University; Ph.D., 1949, New York Univer-
sity; LL.B., 1957, Yale University. This Article, in its original form, was presented as a paper at
the Conference on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility in Miami, Florida in 1979.
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different types or kinds of lawyers who occupy different roles in society.
The roles may be identified from sociological study and from common
observation.
Common to all lawyers are general attributes that distinguish the
lawyer in his professional capacity. These are, notably, a sound moral
disposition and a developed capacity to think. It is instructive to con-
sider how these attributes are developed, with particular reference to
law school, the role of teaching and learning in this process, the charac-
ter of the teacher-student relationship, and the personal experience of
the learner. Close analysis and observation reveal certain strengths in
legal education, but also point to omissions and flaws that might be
(need to be) corrected with pertinent innovations.
In addition to general attributes of all lawyers, there are also specific
attributes that are essential to lawyers performing common but separa-
ble functions. The reality is that some lawyers constitute a kind of self-
designated intellectual and legal elite purporting to serve prestigious
functions in society. All lawyers are trained for this, yet a substantial
segment of lawyers is needed to deal in practical affairs, for which prac-
tical training is needed. Another large segment deals with matters of
personal concern, conscience, and compassion. The contexts and meth-
ods of legal education need to be more substantially developed in this
area as well. The aims and methods of legal education for these differ-
ent roles must be recognized and explicated, always mindful of the
character and competence being developed or neglected, encouraged or
discouraged, in the student. Innovation and change in legal education,
extending the scope of the enterprise as it is now conducted, appear
essential to strong moral, intellectual, and social purpose.
A. The Working Assumptions of Legal Education
Legal education, and education generally, is an enterprise replete
with untested and essentially self-serving assumptions. It is challenging
to inquire, for instance, whether a formal enterprise of instruction is
essential to adult learning, or, even more generally, whether teachers
are essential to learning at all. Even if one accepts the assumption that
teachers and teaching are necessary to the learning process, one may
inquire whether certain modes of instruction, such as the Socratic
teaching method, are essential to learning.
Such inquiry invites a more profound analysis of the objectives of
learning. Especially in professional education, one must determine
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what degree of influence the educational process should exert on the
learner and what manner of man or woman the profession should seek
to produce. And then, if there are considered answers, one should as-
certain the educational process, and the methods and relationships
within this process, that best suit the objectives. There are answers of
sorts that already exist in legal education but they are based on mostly
untested assumptions. One answer is that the Socratic method (so-
called) sharpens thinking. Incisive thinking is essential to the lawyer
because the lawyer must delve through the morass of law for pertinent
guiding principles in order to generate thoroughly reflected and tested
decisions. Another answer is that teachers are essential to the process
that exercises students' minds so that they do learn to "think like law-
yers," and that the most economical form for this teaching is the class-
room. A third and summary "answer" is that the essence of legal
education is to teach "legal thinking," and the better such thinking, the
better the lawyer. All of this is learned with the implicit recognition
that lawyers work primarily within the framework of, or with constant
reference to, juridical institutions. Thus, "clinical legal education" and
law clerking, which characteristically focus on advocacy and litigation
practice, help orient the student to the realities of the legal professional-
ism. These are perhaps the most essential working assumptions in legal
education.
Within the framework of such assumptions one may ask: what is the
significance of the teacher-student relation, how is it negotiated, and
what purpose does it serve? In brief, the teacher is the student's intel-
lectual task master. He is instrumental to the learning process as a
would-be guide to the landscape and provocateur of thought, prefera-
bly sound thought. He joins the student on the field of battle, the class-
room, and jousts with the student, often in deadly seriousness, to test
and temper the latter's intellectual skills. A by-product of this intellec-
tual exercise may be pain and harassment for the student, but this is
regarded as inevitable to sound learning and at worst a passing phe-
nomenon. Other dimensions of the teacher-student relationship, such
as friendship, and moral and ethical consideration, are considered for-
tuitous and of no particular interest or concern.
Another practiced assumption is that the measure of the student's
experience is his mental response to instruction. Most students would
acknowledge that their minds have been exercised by the legal educa-
tion experience and that they have learned to think more sharply and
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incisively. They may have other feelings and judgments about the
character of the legal education experience, but these may not be rele-
vant to the ultimate concern of whether or not they have been effec-
tively taught to "think like a lawyer."
B. Models of Man and Kinds of Lawyers
I should like to back away from the prevailing assumptions in legal
education and address some underlying issues. Is the lawyer in fact
only a technocrat whose hallmark is incisive thinking? Most lawyers
do not accept such a narrow view, and most of their constituents expect
more. What then are the values, attitudes, and skills that characterize,
or should characterize, a lawyer?
The question of what constitutes a lawyer is one of perspective that
ought not to be addressed or answered in parochial terms. Implicit in
the answer are ideas of the worth of humankind and the role of profes-
sionals in ministering to social and human need. The best point of de-
parture for this inquiry may be a consideration of the idealized models
of man that occur in philosophy and history. From this, one may de-
velop a composite of the idealized lawyer and, further, a composite of
the particular lawyer performing discrete functions in society.
The identification of models of man might begin with a Platonic
view1 of a person who, at his best, is knowledgeable, virtuous, and
beautiful. To serve the illusion of the philosopher-king, he is the wisest
and most knowledgeable of all. His learning is formed from dialectical
inquiry. He prescribes for a society that is intellectually inferior and
that requires the benevolent protection of a Guardian. The Platonic
view contemplates an intellectual aristocracy in an ordered and con-
trolled society governed by an intellectual elite. One may see a connec-
tion between this description and de Tocqueville's observation about
lawyers:
Men who have made a special study of the laws and have derived
therefrom habits of order, something of a taste for formalities, and an
instinctive love for a regular concatenation of ideas are naturally strongly
opposed to the revolutionary spirit and to the ill-considered passions of
democracy.
1. See generally PLATO, The Republic, Books 3-5, 7, in 3 DIALOGUES OF PLATO (B. Jowett
trans. 1892).
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So, hidden at the bottom of a lawyer's soul one finds some of the tastes
and habits of an aristocracy.
2
The Sophist Isocrates, 3 by contrast, stressed man's concern with prac-
tical action. He saw the limits of unworldliness and concluded that a
prime function of education was to improve a person's capacity to meet
unforeseeable problems in life with ingenuity and wisdom. For Isocra-
tes, the means to education, and the mark of an educated man, was
linguistic prowess. He ran a school of oratory, but for him oratory was
something more than persuasion. A person properly schooled in lin-
guistic arts reflected culture and absorbed moral traditions that were
translatable into good character and conduct. Isocrates believed in the
power of logos,4 and in the power of the Word, to produce goodness in
life. He failed to appreciate the paradox that words were sometimes a
substitute for action and that linguistic facility could ignore or defeat
what was in reality important.
The Augustinian view5 of the educated man offers another dimen-
sion or a different perspective on the purpose of education. Augustine,
who also lived in a time of strife, sought predictability and certainty in
life, not through a planned world, such as the one Plato brought forth,
but by reconciling differences between pagan and Christian views.
Since reason alone could not reconcile differences, Augustine stressed a
commitment to the ultimate law, that of the Christian church, and en-
couraged learning that stressed discipline and adherence to authority.
Inquiry, and the honing of reason, were acceptable in learning but they
ultimately were to be tempered by and subordinated to authority. Au-
gustine anticipated the model of the scholastic as an educated man.
The scholastic, evolving from the tradition and example of Thomas
Aquinas,6 is a person rigorously schooled in reason so as to deal with
worldly problems and to fashion morality, but with ultimate allegiance
to the authority of God and the Scriptures, the authority of a higher
2. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 243 (1966).
3. See generally 2 ISOCRATES, ORATIONS (G. Norlin trans. 1956).
4. The perception of ancient Greek philosophy that reason, or the manifestation of reason,
was the controlling principle in the universe.
5. See generally A. AUGUSTINE, THE GREATNESS OF THE SOUL (387); Augustine, On the
Models oft/he Catholic Church, in 4 P. SCHAFF, A SELECT LIBRARY OF THE NICENE AND POST-
NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 41-63 (1887); Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, in
2 id. at 544-45, 553-54, 555.
6. See generally 2 T. AQUINAS, BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS AQUINAS (Pegis ed. 1945); 1 T.
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE (Gilby trans. 1954); T. AQUINAS, THE TEACHER (ed. 1954).
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law. Learning stops short of experience that cannot be assimilated into
an essentially Godly and theological view of the universe.
The sacred view of authority in education is considerably tempered
by the great Renaissance scholar and humanist, Erasmus.7 It was Eras-
mus who, in his satire The Praise of Foly, said:
Among men of learned professions the lawyers may claim first place for
themselves, nor is there any other class quite so self-satisfied; for while
they industriously roll up the stone of Sisyphus by dint of weaving to-
gether six hundred laws in the same breadth, no matter how little to the
purpose, and by dint of piling glosses upon glosses and opinions upon
opinions, they contrive to make their profession seem the most difficult of
all. What is really tedious commends itself to them as brilliant.
Erasmus intended that we not take ourselves too seriously and that
we see some grace in life. He sought to reconcile the corruption of the
prevailing Christian society through a renewal based on classical
sources. His was a voice of reason and toleration where others were
preaching rigid adherence to authority or intense fanatical reaction.
The Erasmusan model of the educated man contemplated a breadth of
understanding and humane tolerance in the context of strong moral
commitment and sound learning. The educated man was wise, mag-
nanimous, and temperate. Withal, he possessed discipline and integ-
rity. It is only Erasmus' adherence to the classics as the source of
"humanity" that restricted and refuted that aspect of culture which
comes from the contribution of science.
Another harmonizing view of the educated man, and one that broad-
ened the base, was provided by the distinguished Protestant philoso-
pher-theologian Comenius. 9 His model of the educated person was
that of a pansophist, one who seeks knowledge from all sources. Co-
menius offered a world view that stressed political community, reli-
gious reconciliation, educational cooperation, and intellectual
harmony. He would extend the promise of education to all classes and
sexes and to persons of varying capacity. Comenius sought discovery
7. Seegenerall, 3 D. ERASMUS, THE COLLOQUIES OF DESIDERIUS ERASMUS (E. Johnson ed.
1900); D. ERASMUS, THE PRAISE OF FOLLY (H. Hudson trans. 1941); Erasmus, Upon the Right
Method of Instruction, in W. WOODWARD, DESIDERIUS ERASMUS CONCERNING THE AIM AND
METHOD OF EDUCATION 1162 (1964).
8. D. ERASMUS, THE PRAISE OF FOLLY, supra note 7, at 76.
9. See generally J. COMENIUS, THE ANALYTICAL DIDACTIC OF COMENIUS (V. Jelinek trans.
1953); 2 J. COMENIUS, THE GREAT DIDACTIC (M. Keatinge trans. 1907); JOHN AMos COMENIUS,
1592-1670, SELECTIONS (I. Urwin trans. 1957).
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through the method of induction. Training in thinking was to be rigor-
ous and disciplined, and faithful to a continuing yet broadened author-
ity. Comenius encouraged mental rigor, but also saw a broader
understanding and tolerance of others, and greater opportunity, as im-
portant dimensions of the educational experience.
A heavy stress on intellect and formal learning characterizes most of
the prescriptions for a well-educated person presented thus far. The
"good" professional is, implicitly, the well-educated person, whatever
that may mean. Rousseau's point of view adds still another dimension
to our understanding. In Rousseau's classical treatise on education,
Emile,'0 the truly educated and competent person is not one who has
been denied the free expression of emotion or forced into intellectual
precocity before he has gained natural experience. Rousseau viewed
the experience of feeling, uncontaminated by a strong and preemptive
conceptual order, as the means to broader understanding, insight, and
creativity. As he expressed the notion, "I felt before I thought: this is
the common lot of humanity."'
1
Rousseau's prescription for education was for a fairly free experi-
ence. He did not wish it to be narrowly vocational or prematurely in-
tellectual. Rousseau's theories contrast sharply with those of Locke. 2
Locke considered the learner as a tabula rasa13 and would instill
mental discipline through a formal program of ordered and somewhat
classical learning. His objective was a useful education but its ultimate
purpose was to breed gentlemen.
The moral conditions of education and education as a participatory
experience are the hallmarks of John Dewey's contribution 4 to the
field. "I believe that education is a process of living and not a prepara-
tion for future living," he said. 5 He saw goodness and competence as
merging in the truly educated person. The educated person was to be,
by a process of openness to experience, a reflective person. This reflec-
tiveness is characterized by the intellectual habit of open minded in-
10. J. ROUSSEAU, EMILE (W. Boyd ed. 1962).
11. J. ROUSSEAU, CONFESSIONS 6 (Modem Library ed. 1945).
12. See generally J. LOCKE, CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING §§ 1, 3, 6-7 (T. Fowler ed.
1890); J. LOCKE, The Epistle Dedicatory, in SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION lXi (R.
Quick ed. 1902).
13. The concept is that the mind is a blank slate before receiving outside impressions.
14. See generally J. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1919); J. DEWEY, HUMAN NA-
TURE AND CONDUCT (1922); Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, 54 SCHOOL J. (1897).
15. Dewey, supra note 14, at 78.
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quiry, and it contributes to responsible experimental action. In his
treatise entitled How We Think, 16 Dewey outlined a system of problem
solving based on a combination of reflective thought and pragmatic
consideration. Thinking begins with a situation of experienced "per-
plexity, confusion, or doubt."17 Using the data provided by observa-
tion and experience, the mind produces suggestions, and then
hypotheses, and ultimately elaborations. The process should be one of
highly reflective thought that does not foreclose too quickly nor accept
the first or easiest available solution. There is then a plan for action,
since the ultimate objective of reflected thought is to produce a situa-
tion that is clear, coherent, settled, and harmonious.18
The educated person in Dewey's ideal is a constant learner in life
who approaches each experience with reflective thinking. His con-
sciousness extends to both individual (personal) and group (collective)
experience in an effort to assimilate these into a happy or harmonious
life experience. Dewey strongly believed in the perfectability of
humankind.
The uniqueness of the human being and of his experience was the
emphasis Buber19 gave to the consciousness of the truly educated per-
son. In a largely ethical and moral view of life, he stressed the impor-
tance of responsibility and genuineness. To achieve these, the educated
person must know how to listen as well as talk. He participates with
another in meaningful dialogue, authenticated by being as well as by
seeming. One must have the courage to be truly one's self in relation-
ships. There must be genuine exploration by the student, but there
must also be a genuine encounter with the authority of the teacher's
values. There is an emphasis on truth, and a social by-product is re-
spect. It is the world of I-Thou that takes predominance over the world
of I-It. It is the way the world is to be met rather than the way it is to
be used that is important.
The ideal evolves from a composite of all of the views represented.
The professional person is an idealized figure in Western society and
thought to be something more than a skillful methodologist. The desir-
16. J. DEWEY, How WE THrNK (rev. ed. 1933).
17. Id. at 12.
18. Id. at 72-76.
19. See generally M. BUBER, The Education of Character, in BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 104
(R. Smith trans. 1965); M. BUBER, I AND THOU (R. Smith trans. 1958); M. BUBER, Elements ofthe
Inter-human, in THE KNOWLEDGE OF MAN 2 (M. Friedman ed. 1965).
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able lawyer, then, or several of them, might be seen as knowledgeable,
virtuous, and learned in dialectical inquiry. He or she is a guardian for
society and a leader of humankind. He is concerned with practical ac-
tion and skilled in the use of language as a prime mover of social inter-
ests. He reflects discipline and respects and adheres to an ultimate
authority. He is, withal, tolerant and magnanimous, and he shows a
breadth of perspective. Though disciplined and educated, he is also a
vital and feeling person. He is open minded, reflective, and inquiring,
with strong moral purpose. He values meaningful and considerate re-
lationships with others.
The idealized description denotes several kinds of lawyers, many of
whom have been identified, at least in terms of the roles they play, in
sociological studies of the profession. Smigel has surveyed and de-
scribed the implicit values, professional practice, and educational back-
ground of The Wall Street Lawyer, one of an elitist group serving an
elitist clientele in American society.20 Bazelon uses a biographical ap-
proach to describe the functions of a lawyer who is handmaiden to
practical business affairs in both an analytical and prescriptive role.21
Carlin conducted a survey that showed the stratification of the New
York City bar in terms of the types of services and kinds of clients
served, viewed primarily in relation to the differences in ethical prac-
tices and perspectives of the lawyers. 22 Carlin also conducted a survey
to determine some of the professional practice characteristics of solo
practitioners in Chicago and observed that they serve the less affluent,
more personally troubled persons in society.23 Reed surveyed the bar
of the city of Springfield, Massachusetts and confirmed three types of
practice, elite, middle (business), and poor, and then posited the need
for different kinds of training and skills to serve the different interests
involved.24
There are, in a kind of self-proclaimed status order, the intellectually
elite who master the intellectual skills of logic and rhetoric as the
means to affect profound legal and social matters. They are the judges
20. E. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 160-67, 340 (1964).
21. Bazelon, Portrait ofa Business Genera/int, 29 COMMENTARY 277 (1960).
22. J. CARLIN, LAWYER'S ETHICS (1966).
23. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OwN (1962).
24. T. Reed, Training the American Aristocracy (1978) (unpublished manuscript on file at
Delaware Law School, Widener University). This work is to be published in book form; for its
first chapter see Reed, Training the American Aristocracy-An Historical Examination a/American
Legal Education Models, 6 TEx. S. L. Rav. 317 (1981).
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and the teachers and the lawyers in the most prestigious law firms.
There are others, a larger number, who qualify by virtue of an educa-
tion that has developed their intellectual discipline and knowledge of
legal principles to govern and administer the practical affairs of society.
These are the business and corporate lawyers, government lawyers, and
community officials. Then, there is another substantial group who may
be characterized by their ministrations to the more urgent, intimate,
and private needs and dispositions of ordinary citizens. They minister
more directly to the conscience and the psyche of humanity, where per-
sonal concern and compassion govern. These are the lawyers with
small general practices, those who address family and criminal
problems and who often use legal means to protest the inequities of
society and its governance, especially as these affect individual persons.
A lawyer may engage in different functions but there are some tran-
scendent values in what a lawyer is, by tradition and qualification.
Every lawyer is considered to be a moral exemplar and something of an
expert in clear headed thinking. He is, traditionally, an "officer of the
court" as well as a "counselor at law." The lawyer's social hallmark is
responsibility for governance and for sound decision making.
There are, then, both general and specific components in the makeup
of a lawyer. The general component is a sound moral disposition and a
developed capacity to think. The specific components are aggregated
to particular societal functions, and may be variously characterized in
terms of intellectual precocity, responsiveness to practical necessity,
and inclination for humane concern and compassion.
II. THE EDUCATIONAL TASK: TRAINING IN VALUES,
SKILLS AND ATTITUDES
A. The General Component in the Makeup of Lawyers
I propose first to consider the educational implications of instilling
both a sound moral disposition and a developed capacity to think in
the law student. In this context, the significance of the teacher-student
relationship and its leading characteristics will be developed.
1. Sound Moral Disposition
In some attenuated fashion, there is an assumption that vigorous in-
tellectual disciplining brings with it a kind of moral disposition and
development. Consider the education of John Stuart Mill by his father,
[Vol. 59:853
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James Mill.2 5 At one point, the young Mill describes his learning expe-
rience as follows:
In going through Plato and Demosthenes, since I could now read these
authors, as far as the language was concerned, with perfect ease, I was not
required to construe them sentence by sentence, but to read them aloud to
my father, answering questions when asked: but the particular attention
which he paid to elocution (in which his own excellence was remarkable)
made this reading aloud to him a most painful task. Of all things which
he required me to do, there was none which I did so constantly ill, or in
which he so perpetually lost his temper with me. He had thought much
on the principles of the art of reading, especially the most neglected part
of it, the inflections of voice, or modulation as writers on elocution call it
.... and had reduced it to rules, grounded on the logical analysis of a
sentence. These rules he strongly impressed upon me, and took me se-
verely to task for every violation of them: but I even then remarked
(though I did not venture to make the remark to him) that though he
reproached me when I read a sentence ill, and told me how I ought to
have read it, he never, by reading it himself, showed me how it ought to
be read.26
It is clear that personal discipline and responsiveness to authority
here are as important to learning as mental discipline. There is a moral
disposition to obey the teacher, and this is a condition for effective
learning. Looseness of thought, personal choice, and dispositions to
pleasure have no place in Mill's learning. Both teaching and learning
evidence an inherent moral disposition in teacher and learner, with a
corresponding response in the learner. Morality here is a kind of com-
pelling, Kantian commitment to duty. Today, the duties and obliga-
tions in both teaching and learning may be defined differently. For
instance, there may be a duty on the part of the teacher to observe the
most effective means for the student to learn. A more egalitarian
model, based on a range of reciprocal duties, may be more appropriate
than Mill's authoritarian model. Nonetheless, duties and obligations in
teaching and learning still demonstrate the importance of moral dispo-
sition as a condition of educational experience.
The assumption that moral disposition and moral response are given
in professional learning is based on the view that sound moral disposi-
tion is a fixed characteristic, the development of which occurs in the
formative years of life, substantially predating law school. It occurs in
25. J. MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (Columbia ed. 1924).
26. Id. at 16.
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character development both within the family and in early academic
education. A corollary assumption is that sound moral disposition,
once acquired, remains operative without any process of reinforcement
or further learning. The education of character or the reinforcement of
moral sensitivities is not regarded as an appropriate or necessary sub-
ject for legal education. These are assumptions and policies that pass
unchallenged until an egregious public event, such as Watergate or
mass cheating scandals, draws attention to the possibility that moral
character should be more than simply vouchsafed. This notion is par-
ticularly applicable to those who are to be professional persons and
whose work involves the potential for corruption in exercising great
power. Common sense suggests that this should be a matter of continu-
ing concern in professional education.
Arguably, there are influences in legal education and, for that matter,
in the practice of law that undermine sound moral disposition in the
law student and lawyer. The student's sound moral disposition, at the
time he enters law school, is essentially untested by the morally rele-
vant challenge of coping with substantial power and making critical
decisions in real life. For most students, the closest moral issue they
face is whether or not to cheat on examinations, and for most, this is
not a considered or acceptable choice. In law school, the student learns
that moral considerations are not decisive either in the analysis or re-
sult that attends legal reasoning or thinking like a lawyer. The attitude
is reinforced by the cultivation of a learning experience in which the
student's personal reactions are deemed irrelevant to the essential char-
acter of legal decision making and legal education. Legal education is
concerned solely with the student's intellectual capacity rather than his
emotional or moral capacities. Additionally, there is the universal
commitment in law to an adversary process, which is not without moral
consequence for the practitioner. Frank differentiated between a "fight
theory" and a "truth theory" of litigation. 7 It is winning that counts.
In its practical application, the adversary process tempts the practi-
tioner to test and even break the rules to secure partisan advantage.
Still, one may say that a solid moral disposition in a healthy person-
ality survives all such risk and temptation. There is even the seemingly
far fetched premise, recently advanced by a molecular biologist study-
ing genetic possibilities, that a kind of genetic imprinting of moral and
27. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRLAL 80-102 (1949).
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ethical dispositions exists in the human personality.28 It adapts itself in
different ways in different cultures but the core of personal morality,
again in the healthy personality, is essentially unchanging.
Hard data are lacking but a better assumption may be that moral
disposition does not survive well when left unattended and unnurtured.
This is especially true in a learning and work environment that is, in
varying degrees, indifferent to rectitude, insensitive and even hostile to
a concern with personal experience, and inclined toward excesses and
abuses. What, then, are some of the measures that could serve to se-
cure sound moral disposition? There are some notable possibilities.
Judgments of value that recognize the legitimacy of moral concerns,
provide the means for moral analysis, and accept the validity and even
the primacy of moral experience and judgments need to be developed
in legal education. The answer here calls for something more substan-
tial than modest intellectual inquiry into the ethical rules that are pos-
ited to govern professional conduct, though inquiry into professional
responsibility, such as that provided by Redlich,29 is helpful. It is note-
worthy that at least one law professor and former dean of a major law
school, Thomas Shaffer, has set for himself the task of providing the
means for moral analysis in learning about law and lawyering.3 0 Stu-
dent learning must be attended by moral questions that temper the
purely intellectual character of law learning. Extrinsic rewards in
learning need to be based on consciousness of issues and judgments
that are not largely confined to intellectual analysis alone.
The quality of personal experience in legal education, in the relation
between teachers and students and between students and their learning,
also can be developed through a heightened consciousness of moral
and ethical considerations. ("Ethical considerations" are here regarded
as the rules and ratio decidendi of moral behavior.) One conceptual
source is in the essentially ethical relations outlined by Hohfeldt.'
Hohfeldtian concepts of duties, rights, privileges, powers, no-duties,
and no-rights, can be dusted off and given a respected and visible place
28. Stent, The Poverty of Scientism and the Promise of Structural/st Ethics, in KNOWLEDOE,
VALUE AND BELIEF 225 (1977).
29. See N. REDLICH, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1976).
30. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 231 (1979). See
also Shaffer, Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 721 (1975).
31. Hohfeldt, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913). See also Hohfeldt, Fundamental Legal Conceptions in Judicial Reasoning, 26
YALE LJ. 710 (1917).
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in the councils of legal education and in the conduct of a law school. I
propose a kind of Fair Educational Practices, analagous to Fair Em-
ployment Practices. It should be noted that I do not intend mere exer-
cises in conceptual distinctions between ethical terms because they tend
more to obfuscate the real issues and encourage logical fallacy and le-
galistic casuistry. Ethicists, like lawyers, are also prone to the kind of
pendantry described by Erasmus.32
There is a range of concerns and relationships in law school that are
attended by ethical considerations, but they mostly go unnoticed. The
professor's duty of what and how to teach and the student's duty of
what to learn and how to respond to the professor's teaching are ethical
matters. They are barely noticed in this context because administrative
and instructional policy, along with habits of practice, preempt the
matter. An unlimited authority by the educational institution and the
teacher is asserted (presumed); ethical issues that are imbedded in poli-
cies and practices are more or less dispensed with or go unnoticed. The
possibility that a professor must (should) define some limited power of
assertion about prerequisite learning surfaces at this point in the analy-
sis. There may be room for the negotiation of agreement about learn-
ing so as to better serve individual learning needs and dispositions.
And this may be defined only partially by ideas of what content ought
to be covered.
The corollary of the professor's particular power is that there is indi-
vidual student right (not to say need) to structure at least some of both
the content and the method of learning. Beyond what is required-and
this in itself is a difficult question-a student may choose to learn and
concentrate in areas of learning that are of interest to him. He may
choose to learn by means that are the most helpful and beneficial to
him as learning experiences (of course, within the limits of reasonable
economic considerations and instructional availability that govern the
particular teaching facility). Of those students who exercise these
rights, in an environment more conscious of ethical prerogatives and
responsibilities, some may prefer to concentrate on learning criminal
law, others may prefer to learn all they can about land development,
and others may prefer to explore the complexities of legal counseling.
Some may prefer the style of the individual tutorial in learning, others
may prefer independent study and a research project over classroom
32. See text following notes 7 & 8 supra.
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instruction and an examination, while still others may learn better from
exposure to practical exigencies as distinguished from mere conceptual
inquiry. The style and substance of law learning, then, reflects some
ethical regard as well as concern for other considerations. Educational
policy strikes balances between judgments of intellectual prerequisites,
economic feasibilities, and moral and psychological considerations in
learning.
There are other areas of ethical contact between teachers and stu-
dents, and students and their learning, that are too numerous to be de-
veloped here. Another specific example may be helpful, however. The
teacher-student relationship, in ethical terms, may contemplate sets of
mutual duties between the teacher and student in the examination pro-
cess. The teacher's duty is to construct an examination that fairly tests
the student's legal facility and knowledge, as well as his professional
acumen. The examination is not perceived to be merely a synopsis on
subject matter and pure thinking, but it is also a term of the relation-
ship between teacher and student. The student's duty is to prepare ade-
quately for the examination and reflect as honestly and thoroughly as
he can his knowledge and abilities in the matters being tested. The
matter may not, however, end at this point. The teacher may have an
additional duty, and the student may have a correlative right, to review
the examination results. The requirements and benefits of learning
may turn significantly on the kind of feedback the student receives after
he has taken a law school examination.
For the most part, ethical considerations in law teaching and learn-
ing are preempted or obscured by absolute content requirement as-
sumptions. The visibility of moral and ethical relations in the conduct
of legal education must be raised through refined definition and consci-
entious practice. In this way, the sound moral dispositions in students
and lawyers receive appropriate reinforcement, with strong implica-
tions for modelling later professional behavior.
It should be noted that embedded in the quality of relations between
persons are intertwining emotional, moral, and rational considerations.
It is the rational dimension of the relationship between a law teacher
and a law student that is most practiced and recognized. Teacher and
student relate to one another in terms of an attainable rational objec-
tive pertaining to law and legal professionalism and both labor, to the
extent they are capable, in the most rational terms to advance teaching
and learning on the subject matter. In this teaching and learning enter-
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prise, however, there is also an inevitable emotional component. The
emotional process generally is not specifically noted or articulated but,
in addition to a frequent moral implication, it can have a power and
intensity that is of surpassing importance in the relationship. Watson,
in particular, and I to a lesser extent, both have written on the impor-
tance of personality and emotional disposition in the teaching and
learning process as they relate to the learning of law and the develop-
ment of legal professionalism.3 3 Both writers have made observations
about the role of anxiety in teaching and learning, 34 about teacher per-
sonalities and teaching styles,35 about the significance of aggression in
the teaching and learning process, 36 about student personalities and
modelling after teachers,37 and about the emotional implications of dif-
ferent teaching methods.3" Shaffer and I, utilizing systematic empirical
observation, have also written in detail on the impact and effect of
emotion on attitudes of legal education.39 Though speculative and
more remote in time, Frank's observations about lawyers' needs for
33. Redmount,A Clinical View of Law Teaching, 48 S. CAL. L. Rv. 705 (1975); RedmountA
Conceptual View ofthe Legal Education Process, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 129 (1972); Redmount, Hu-
manistic Law Through Legal Education, I CONN. L. REV. 201 (1968); Redmount, Transactional
Emphasis in Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1974); Watson, Lawyers and Professional-
ism: A Further Psychiatric Perspective on Legal Education, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 248 (1975); Wat-
son, Reections on the Teaching of Criminal Law, 37 U. DET. L.J. 701 (1960); Watson, Some
PsychologicalAspects of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1963); Wat-
son, The Quest/or Professional Competence: PsychologicalAspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN.
L. REv. 93 (1968); Watson, The Watergate Lawyer Syndrome: An Educational Defciency Disease,
26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441 (1974).
34. See Redmount, 4 Conceptual View of the Legal Education Process, supra note 33, at 135-
36; Watson, Some Psychological Aspects 0/Teaching Professional Responsibility, supra note 33, at
13, 18, 20. See also Comment, Anxiety and the First Semester OfLaw School, 1968 Wis. L. REv.
1201.
35. See Redmount, 4 Clinical View of Law Teaching, supra note 33, passim; Watson, The
Quest/or Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, supra note 33, at
106-16.
36. See Redinount, Humanistic Law Through LegalEducation, supra note 33, at 205-06; Wat-
son, The Quest/or Professional Competenc" PsychologicalAspects of Legal Education, supra note
33, at 101-05; Watson, supra note 34, at 18-20. See also Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: 4
Polemic, 1 YALE REv. L. & Soc. ACT. 71 (1970); Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Educa.
tion, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 457-60 (1970).
37. See Redmount, A Clinical View of Law Teaching, supra note 33, at 706-09; Watson, The
Quest/or Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, supra note 33, at
158-60.
38. See Redmount, Humanistic Law Through LegalEducation,supra note 33, at 204-06; Wat-
son, The Quest/or Professional Competence: Psychological.4spects of Legal Education, supra note
33, at 116-41. See also Peairs, Essay on the Teaching ofLaw, 12 J. LEGAL EDuc. 323 (1960).
39. See generally T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE
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certainty, and tendencies to mythologize, are also worthy of
consideration.4"
The moral dimension of the relationship between teacher and stu-
dent has been expressed and programmed best by Rogers, a distin-
guished humanist and psychologist. Addressing himself specifically to
the teacher-student relation and deriving his observations from the way
learning occurs in psychotherapy, he postulates three conditions for the
teacher-learner relationship that are essential to effective learning.
41
The first is characterized as "unconditional positive regard," where the
teacher, in a kind of acceptance without conditions or demands, has
and expresses an accepting and a caring attitude toward the student.
Second, there must be "empathic understanding," such that the
teacher, in a sense, puts himself in the shoes of his student in order to
better sense and understand what the student is experiencing. And
third, there must be "congruence" of feeling, understanding, and exhib-
ited behavior, so that a person is not expressing one thing, feeling an-
other, and thinking yet another. To the degree that these are shared
attributes between teacher and student, the psychological conditions for
trust, understanding, and learning exist. The quality of relations de-
scribed here is nominally emotional, but is in fact moral. They repre-
sent an explicit manifestation of the "I-Thou" relationship explicated
by the ethicist and philosopher, Buber,42 and are distinguished from
the more detached, cold, amoral set of relationships that Buber has de-
scribed as "I-It." 43
It is again noteworthy that the moral dimension is not entirely sepa-
rate from emotional and rational considerations. They commingle but
are, for purposes of clarification and demonstration, differentiable.
In brief summary, then, formal legal education in general, and the
teaching-learning relation in particular, have a significant contribution
to make to the general attribute of sound moral disposition fostered in
lawyers. Moral and ethical dimensions accompany the learning experi-
ence and they are created and realized in the quality of relationship
between teacher and student. These can be effectively raised in con-
(1977). See also Eron & Redmount, The Effect of Legal Education on Attitudes, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC.
431 (1957).
40. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 7-12, 76-83, 89-99, 207-18 (1930). See also J.
FRANK, supra note 27, at 37-61, 254-61.
41. L. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON 279-96 (1961).
42. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
43. Id.
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sciousness and programmed by giving express attention in the educa-
tional process to ethical and moral requirements, both in the analysis of
legally related conduct and in the expression of individual and interac-
tive teacher and student behavior.
2. A Developed Capacity to Think
A proper point of departure for reflection on developing capacity to
think is the seminal work of John Dewey, and especially his classic
How We Think.' Dewey addressed himself to the problem of training
"habits of thought." He noted that "learning is something that the pu-
pil has to do himself and for himself, the initiative lies with the learner.
The teacher is a guide and director; he steers the boat but the energy
that propels it must come from those who are learning. ' 45 In Dewey's
view, the teacher, to be effective, must address himself to two problems.
First, he must contemplate the student as an interested party in the
learning experience, one who contributes interest, motivation, and a
style or system in learning. Then, he must realize the conditions that
enhance the student's disposition to think, namely, the kinds of presen-
tation and the kinds of material that do most to generate interest and
inquiry.
The learner has already developed some capacity to think before
reaching law school. His pre-law school academic credentials vouch
for this. He has, at the least, developed normal adult capacities to
think. Through his education and living he has likely developed some
ability to inquire and analyze by way of analogy, the ability to utilize
cause-and-effect analysis, and the ability to think in the abstract. The
extension of thinking in law school is into that area identified as "legal
reasoning," described so aptly by Levi as reasoning by use of example
where cases provide the example.46 Thinking here is a process in three
steps.47 First, cases are presented and the learner observes and contem-
plates the similarities in fact and circumstance in the cases under con-
sideration. Then, the principle(s) or rule(s) that act as a fulcrum for
decision are brought into focus, chosen by the observer because of their
apposition and relevance to the cases. Finally, reasoning ability is uti-
lized to select what appears to be the most appropriate or proximate
44. J. DEWEY, supra note 16.
45. Id. at 35.
46. E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948).
47. Id. at 1-8.
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rule given the particular facts under analysis. At this point, the deci-
sion maker or commentator broadens his basis of judgment by adding
facts, rules, and other considerations that he regards as essential or con-
sequential to the determination of a "proper" or sensible result. This
legal reasoning process, exercised with considerable sophistication, is
perhaps best described by the eminent jurist Cardozo.48
This, in essence, is the traditional law school learning process that
imbues the student qua lawyer with "a developed capacity to think."
The "case method," ubiquitous in legal education, is the spirited dialec-
tic that serves the learning process. Properly done, it exercises the stu-
dent's mind, especially in its capacity to reason from analogy and deal
with causal relations. There is also incitement and challenge to crea-
tive thought where reasoning must (could) be bent to achieve a desired
result. The context of this thinking exercise is a variety of social and
moral problems cast in historical and legal frameworks of experience.
The teacher in this learning process, by custom and convention, is an
agent provocateur. He incites the student to think, questions and chal-
lenges him with examples, criticizes the thinking result, sets up hypo-
thetical alternatives to consider, and generally tends to the proper
training of this thinking style and habit. At its intellectual best, teach-
ing and learning to "think like a lawyer" is rigorous and demanding.
In turn, such thinking is the hallmark of the penetrating lawyer.
Though one may accept that the process of cultivating "a developed
capacity to think" is largely successful in "better" law schools, there are
nevertheless some critical observations to be made. It is important to
recognize that it is essentially only one style and habit of thinking that
is developed, and, what is worse, it is implicitly deemed to be a suffi-
cient method to attack all manner of problems and produce a suffi-
ciently probative, cogent, and sensitive practical result. The system of
legal decision making, especially the judicial process, is singlemindedly
committed to it. Conant points out, in his discussion of two modes of
thought,49 that any "one mode may be underdeveloped or overdevel-
oped; if so, the balance will need redressing."50 Conant's credo is that
"a free society requires today among its teachers, professors and practi-
tioners two types of individuals: the one prefers the empirical-induc-
48. See genera4lv B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF LAW (1924); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
49. J. CONANT, Two MODES OF THOUGHT (1964).
50. Id. at xxv.
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tive method of inquiry: the other the theoretical-deductive outlook."',
He observes that "both modes of thought have their dangers; both have
their advantages."5 2 He then concludes that "continuation of intellec-
tual freedom requires a tolerance of the activities of the proponents of
the one mode by the other."53 His distinction, to give an oversimplified
example, is between the thinking of speculative or theorizing philoso-
phers and that of empirical or practical scientists.
The training of thinking in law school is pervasively a unidimen-
sional process with fringe consideration of methods, other than the dia-
lectical case method, of organizing and interpreting experience. It
essentially fits and suits the operative juridical system though it may be
prejudicial in the way it operates in other contexts, such as the law
office practice. The thinking style is incisive but narrow. It encourages
focused decision, but does not encourage open minded inquiry. It cre-
ates authority by expanding reason, but at the expense of narrowing the
base of experience in order to produce conformity in analysis and deci-
sion making. It is inimical to dimensions of experience that are "un-
ruly" or irrational, and hence can display no deference toward or
consideration of emotional or partly formed experience. It is indiffer-
ent to moral expression. It cannot regard single or personal events with
adequate individualized concern and consideration. It is, in sum, a
sharply honed method that tends to characterize its practitioner, the
lawyer, as a person with practiced technique in a certain style of analy-
sis but not much else.
The cultivation of narrow gauged, unidimensional thinking capacity
enjoys a remarkable degree of acceptance in legal pedagogy. Llewel-
lyn, in a short book explicating the teaching and learning process in
law,5 4 said: "The hardest job of the first year is to lop off your common
sense, to knock your ethics into temporary anesthesia. Your view of
social policy, your sense of justice-to knock them out of you along
with woozy thinking, along with ideas all fuzzed along their edges."55
It apparently did not occur to Llewellyn, as it may not occur to others,
to question whether such pain in learning and sacrifice in humane val-
ues, even as a temporary expedient, is necessary to the teaching of
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930).
55. Id. at 101.
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thinking. If, in fact, legal education did all that Llewellyn proposed,
would it not be a disaster? Are there not alternative ways of thinking in
relation to law and alternative modes in teaching and learning
thinlking?
There are affirmative answers. One is a brief tactical answer that
addresses itself to teacher-student relations as they impinge on the stu-
dent's motivation to learn. The teacher can simultaneously teach and
be a humane person, the example of James Mill to the contrary. The
teacher should be vigilant not to induce more pain in learning for the
student than is necessary. When stimulation and correction are
needed, support and encouragement are often more effective inducers
than punishment and ridicule. In broader humanistic terms, a positive
regard and empathy for the student acts as support and inducement to
his learning. The ritual of the law teacher in acting the role of the
"heavy," sometimes even the humorous heavy, is unnecessary and even
counterproductive. (Is the asperity of a Kingsfield necessary?) In a self
styled commitment to "knock out the woozy thinking" the teacher may
teach too much, and more for personal pleasure and satisfaction than
for the benefit of students. One may argue as to the degree of damage
involved, but little learning value appears in aggressive confrontation
in the name of teaching thinking, and there may be a corresponding
waste of valuable learning time and inclination. If a particular teach-
ing disposition should be cultivated in the dialectical classroom, it is
not one of toughness but, in the tradition of original Socratic example,
one of fairness. The attitude focuses less on the mockery of error than
it does on the paradoxes of inquiry.
The technical or stylistic adjustment to the dialectical teaching of
thinking does not in itself provide a different mode of thinking. Some-
thing more fundamental is required. A choice may be offered that is
more attuned to the needs and requirements of law office practice as
distinguished from litigation practice, and to the requirements of public
service as distinguished from private advocacy. A particularly perti-
nent recommendation may be the teaching of a kind of field theory of
investigation. It may be timely to dust off the neglected contributions
of the distinguished psychologist, Lewin.56 Lewin, borrowing from
Einstein, thought in terms of an analogue for social investigation based
56. See K. LEWIN, A DYNAmic THEORY OF PERSONALrrY (1935); K. LEWIN, PRINCIPLES OF
TOPOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY (1936).
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on field theory in physics. His transpositions to the field of investiga-
tion of human events and problem solving produced a coherent theory
of how to proceed in inquiry. It is a model for the development of sys-
tematic contextual inquiry in the learning process.
Lewin worked with a concept of "life space" to denote the character-
istics of person and environment combining to form the essential con-
text, or the value, behavioral, and circumstantial attributes that form
the general considerations under study. He then introduced the con-
cept of situation or particular experience that has bearing on the many
characteristics of life space. The situation emitted different kinds of
characteristics or facts that had to be properly placed and assessed in
the general picture. He then made reference to different kinds of tem-
poral and causal relationships that could or could not determine some
aspects of modification or change in the life space. He next introduced
the concept of forces that had direction and movement and could im-
pact on different regions of life space. There are concepts of boundary,
and of intensity (sharpness) or resistance (barriers), as directional
forces sought to impact on or penetrate different regions of life space.
The imagery conjures up a party's total life circumstances (economic
condition, family or social position, psychological and ethical disposi-
tion) influenced by certain events (a decision to purchase a business, a
disabling or possibly terminal illness) that results in certain facts and
possibilities (creating debt, possible death) and may have certain causal
consequences (the risk of excessive burden to the party, the need to
protect the family). Particular forces (the availability of money for a
loan, the preparation of a will), depending on whether and how pur-
sued, could affect economic, emotional, or family well-being within the
constituted life space. Issues might arise as to boundaries (how far a
party should go in planning or intervening) and what barriers (opposi-
tion of a spouse, prohibitive legal costs) or intensities (very strong dis-
positions about not going into debt or not facing the making of a will)
could affect direction and movement in the life space.
A developed theoretical system would include magnitudes for the
characteristics mentioned and, in fact, it was Lewin's intention to
mathematicize his theory. He did so, to some extent, by demonstrating
his concepts in the form of topological geometry. Even without this
esoteric development, the Lewinian framework may be useful in dia-
gramming the legal and lawyering situation. It lends itself to a substan-
tially more thorough account of the reality bound lawyering and legal
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experience than that accorded the planning lawyer through newer re-
finements in analytical reasoning.
The field theory approach to investigation and decision appears to be
particularly apt for lawyers who must encompass a breadth of practical
considerations in their decision making and view law as one important
variable in a larger or more differentiated outcome not controlled by
legal rules alone. This is the work of lawyers engaged in planning with
clients and of those who have broad managerial or governmental re-
sponsibility. Field theory development, as a mental process, is rigorous
and requires sharpening the skills of identification, analysis, and inter-
pretive conclusion. It is experience based. Its commitment is to sys-
tematic description and explanation. It challenges imagination and
encourages comprehensive reflection.
There is another thinking mode that should be mentioned because of
its relevance to lawyers and lawyers' work. This is the intuitional
method. Bruner discusses the nature of intuitive thinking and how it is
affected.57 He reflects on the conditions of learning and the characteris-
tics of learners that appear most conducive to the exercise of good in-
tuitive thinking. For instance, he notes that the development of good
intuitive thinking seems to require self confidence and courage in the
student.58 A fairly broad scope of knowledge in a subject matter, or at
least a working familiarity with the structure of that knowledge, also
appears to be important.59 Remarkable lawyer performance is some-
times associated with developed intuitive capacity. As yet, not enough
may be understood about the process of intuition to fashion a program
of study for legal education purposes. Intuitional thinking is, however,
another dimension of "developed thinking capacity" that may benefit
from the efforts of law teachers who seek to comprehend and work with
prospective concepts of learning.
In summary, the lawyer's developed capacity to think is cultivated in
law school through intensive experience in dialectical exercise. The ex-
ercise sharpens incisive thinking, which is aimed at producing deci-
sions. It does so at the expense of a more open minded kind of inquiry
that might contemplate a broader range of conduct and consideration.
Emotional, moral, and personal concerns tend to be abrogated by the
57. J. BRUNER, THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION 55-68 (1960). See also M. WEsTcoTr, To-
WARD A CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIoN (1968).
58. J. BRUNER, supra note 57, at 65.
59. Id. at 62-63.
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process of dialectical thinking in law. There are alternative modes for
developing capacity to think, and alternative modes of thinking such as
the intuitional and field theory investigation methods. These have not
yet been adapted in legal education. Broadening the base in learning
to "think like a lawyer" is likely to be especially pertinent and useful to
lawyers involved in planning functions and to those involved in man-
agement and government. At present, the kind of thinking method that
is learned and practiced in legal education is mostly suited for partici-
pation in the juridical process. Used to solve problems in a real world
context, the method may tend to produce procrustean results.
B. Training the Intellectual and Legal Elite
It is notable that in legal education intellectual merit rather than so-
cial position has qualified the student for acceptance into training. Yet,
ironically, once the student enters law school, as T.J. Reed has ob-
served,60 his education is attuned to elitist legal roles and responsibili-
ties. The roles are those of being a judge, a teacher of lawyers, or a
member of a large and prestigious law firm. What are the essential
values, skills, and attitudes that are recognized here? How is legal edu-
cation constituted so as to serve these values, skills, and attitudes?
What manner of teacher-student relation is involved?
Again with some irony, the general components of legal education
also tend to coincide with and serve the specific needs and characteris-
tics of the elitist lawyer group. It is as though legal education is geared
to their tasks and circumstances. A propensity to be especially just and
wise is what is cultivated or, at least, is intended. Yet, the moral dispo-
sition that is fundamental to the sense of justice, is assumed to be pre-
existing. The further assumption is that it is mostly unnecessary to
nurture or maintain moral and ethical disposition in any formal or spe-
cific way and it receives peripheral attention at most. The teaching of
"legal ethics," which is mostly an intellectual analysis relating to the
Code of Professional Responsibility that recognizes the issue of moral
sensibility, has become fashionable since Watergate. It is questionable
whether this pedagogical endeavor acts as anything more than a gloss
on analytical reasoning as it relates to legal cases.
The training of the intellect is another matter. This is the substantive
focus of legal education and, as discussed earlier, the particular method
60. T. Reed, supra note 24.
[Vol. 59:853
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/9
EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL RELATIONS
and style of thinking that is cultivated is "legal reasoning" and the
mode of instruction is typically dialectical inquiry. The attendant atti-
tudes and skills that are cultivated afford intellectual precocity: sharp-
ness, acuity, and incisiveness. Casuistry, applied with evidence of
resourcefulness and originality, may also be noted. The materials for
study that provide procedural means to learning to "think like a law-
yer," are mostly juridical decisions and appurtenant reasoning of high
legal authority. They are analyzed in the manner described by Levi.6
There is some additional garniture of statutory and scholarly authority
that is also infused into the study of dialectical exercises. One collat-
eral benefit is that some law, apart from legal reasoning, is learned, but
the means for searching and analytically utilizing the law is mostly
what is intended in teaching. Examinations are conducted almost en-
tirely as exercises in legal reasoning. Grading (hence status and em-
ployment possibility) reflects the degree of skill in this process that the
student has attained and is able to demonstrate. There is also collateral
learning experience, notably in moot court and law review participa-
tion, that further exercises and hones the students' dialectical and rhe-
torical capacities.
The teacher-learner relation in training the intellectual and legal
elite relies primarily on the classroom as the appropriate working con-
text for dialectical exercise. Students, operating in smaller or larger
groups, learn from and with one another as they are challenged by
teachers who are highly skilled in the dialectical process. The class-
room itself becomes a device for radiating the energy, intensity, and
depth of inquiry that those commited to a single purpose can generate.
The teacher is a provocateur who challenges the students to sharper
and ever sharper thinking. He both preserves and fosters educational
direction and discipline, first in his institutionally granted authority to
teach and evaluate students, and second in his choice of what and how
to teach. He controls the discipline and direction of the learning situa-
tion by having at hand the means to enforce effort, by grading, and to
require interest or focus, by rejecting what seems inappropriate to the
learning exercise. He may utilize toughness or fairness but either or
both may be characterized as maintaining a focus on the task at hand-
to learn "legal thinking"--and thus avoid diversion by irrelevancies or
personal considerations.
61. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
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The structure of legal education for the elite is largely tonal and sym-
phonious. This kind of legal education may hold special appeal for
those teachers whose special gifts and personal dispositions contem-
plate and enjoy manifestly aggressive, disciplined intellectual inquiry.
They are likely to be inordinately good at dialectics and rhetoric. Shaf-
fer and I have noted from our study that there may be some discrep-
ancy between the theory and practice of legal education.62 There is
considerably more emphasis on covering a diversity of legal content,
and lecture is more characteristically utilized as the efficient method for
covering ground. There are also peripheral phenomena like clinical
legal education and interdisciplinary subject matter and teaching.
Nevertheless, nearly all law schools are largely committed to the kind
of educational enterprise and the method of approach that has just
been described. It is a matter of tradition dating back to Langdell and
it is backed by the imprimatur and prestige of the most elite law
schools, notably Harvard.
The enviable consistency and harmony in the structure of legal edu-
cation, and the intensity of the kind of learning experience it represents,
precludes the signftant inclusion of other kinds of awareness and
learning. The focus on appellate opinions as the primary subject of
study minimizes interest concern, and learning that relates to facts and
empirical experience. The larger concern is with the reasoning process;
the empirical data are selected, culled, and limited to serve the intellec-
tual exercise. The prime focus on the validity of thought processes
mostly excludes concern with the emotional and moral dimensions of
experience. Not only are these not studied, but they are, in substantial
terms, scarcely noted and are considered distractive. They are merely
irrelevant to the essential learning exercise. The intense competition
for thinking excellence obscures character and disregards personal in-
terest as the need for reward focuses singlemindedly on evidence of
dialectical and rhetorical abilities. The unchallenged autocratic control
of the teacher and the one dimensional teaching method discourage
experiment with and responsiveness to alternative methods of learning
and teaching. These are at best peripheral, no matter how promising or
appropriate they may be.
The price of generating intellectual precocity as the hallmark of elit-
ist lawyering is steep. One may graciously acknowledge that this kind
62. See T. SHAFFER & R. REDmOuNT, supra note 39.
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of legal education has produced a Holmes, a Brandeis, and a Cardozo,
and perhaps there are numerous instances of skillful and imaginative
legal performance where the demonstration of a high level of analytical
capacity and persuasive performance is critical. It is also easy to specu-
late that a practical result can be both detected and undetected Water-
gates or simply too much poor lawyering and client counseling.
C. Training Lawyers to Deal With Practical Affairs
There is a general assumption that lawyers are trained to deal in
practical affairs. This is because they have developed a high level of
skill in incisive and pertinent reasoning, are exposed to and know how
to cope with a legal system for solution and avoidance of practical con-
flicts, and can usually reflect decisiveness and a sense of authority.
Whether these attributes reflect a sensitivity and perspectivity adequate
to deal with practical affairs is another matter. There is some sense that
lawyers tend to be too legalistic. This may be because the legal educa-
tional process is only peripherally attuned to be responsive to practical
necessity. Are there educational alternatives that adequately prepare
the large number of lawyers who must plan and resolve, analyze and
organize, and govern in public and private contexts where the predomi-
nant considerations are legal and economic? These functions comprise
the intermediate (as distinguished from the elitist) world of law and
legal and political administration, which is often simultaneously the
world of commerce and business administration.
Legal education has less need for an overarching intellectually rigor-
ous method of analysis and decision, as in elite lawyering, than for a
process of thinking and experiencing that more effectively blends scope
with depth. A knowledgeable awareness and insight into the pattern-
ing of business, economic, and political relations is equally as impor-
tant as skill in the patterning of legal relations. These basic elements
intercede with one another in the transaction of practical matters,
whether the lawyer or legally trained person is functioning in the con-
text of a court, a private corporation, or a governmental entity. A com-
petent professional managing practical affairs must contemplate the
intertwining effects of fiscal, operational, legal, governmental, person-
nel, and even marketing dimensions of the practical enterprise. Each
may require some familiarity with, or even mastery of, the different
technical systems that are involved. There may be varying degrees of
intellectual and practical complexity. Trying an antitrust case involv-
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ing Xerox or IBM is not within the same scope as organizing a small
business enterprise. Nonetheless, the teaching-learning task is essen-
tially to provide a framework for study of the basic considerations that
govern regardless of scope.
The context of learning and of operation, then, is like a map of law
and legal administration, politics and political administration, and eco-
nomics and business administration. The best intellectual coping
method may be the field theory method of inquiry and decision making
suggested above.63 There are other educational alternatives, presented
by legal and political scholars, and by a lawyer with extensive practical
experience, that contemplate the style, method, and substance of legal
education in non-traditional terms. One such alternative is the policy
oriented theory of inquiry and decision making developed in consider-
able detail by Lasswell and McDougal.64 Their theory encourages a
broad but systematic, rational, and empirical inquiry into the analysis,
choice of conduct, and resolution of practical affairs. The perspective is
of those who govern and manage. Another notable alternative is the
somewhat more conventional legal and case analysis approach of
Brown and Dauer.6 " They emphasize the planning function of lawyers
in a variety of practical problems. The perspective is that of a lawyer
who acts primarily as advisor and consultant.
The appropriate teaching-learning vehicle for training in practical
affairs may be the workshop rather than the classroom. Simple or com-
plex commingled legal, political, and economic problems and chal-
lenges may be presented. Each may require the amassing of fiscal or
economic data and business planning information, governmental regu-
lations, legal and economic surveys, public attitude studies, and more.
Analysis may require legal research, economic forecasting, political in-
telligence, tax study, psychological assessment, and other inquiry. Res-
olution may involve the organization, merger, or reorganization of
enterprises, the drafting of various kinds of regulation or business ar-
rangement agreements, the negotiation of interests, the political or
courtroom solution of uncertainties or conflicts, and other lawyer func-
tions. The complexity of problems, and the different sources of intelli-
gence required, suggest that a team approach to teaching and learning
63. See text following note 56 supra.
64. Lasswel & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the
Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
65. L. BRowN & E. DAuER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS (1978).
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may be most desirable. The teachers may be members of a team-teach-
ing group who cover the necessary range of skills and knowledge re-
quired for learning given the scope of problems under inquiry. The
role of the teacher is more analogous to that of house counsel. Each is
an expert consultant who is familiar with resources, has insights into
analytical complexities, and can offer perspective for realistic and ap-
propriate problem solution. Each teacher is an advisor and, ultimately,
a judge of a student's performance. Students learn to work in a cooper-
ative framework, much in the manner of law partners or business asso-
ciates engaged in a complex consultation. The ambience is one of
policy consultation and busy empirical inquiry rather than rigorous,
competitive dialectical inquiry.
Units of study may focus on the organization of a business enter-
prise, the conduct of community government, the planning of interna-
tional marketing, the merger of corporations, economic development
planning, antitrust regulation, and other distinct areas. Each topic be-
comes a study unit and the focus for a workshop. Within each study
unit, student assignments may be varied so as to reflect a range of skill
development and knowledge accumulation. These may include skills
and knowledge in legal research, analysis of economic surveys, inter-
pretation of attitude and opinion study, conduct of negotiation, and
drafting of regulations and agreements. The teachers shepherd the
learning process. They provide or direct students to materials, define
and sharpen assignments, add information or suggestions, seek creative
alternatives in both learning and problem solution, review preparation
and work at various stages of development, and offer critical judgments
of student performance. Teachers, through their consultative functions
in practical enterprises, may provide real and current problems or chal-
lenges of learning value on which students may work as closely super-
vised junior collaborators. It is noteworthy that reflecting and
developing skills in consultation are as important as thinking ability
and knowledge of subject matter.
Training in practical affairs is not restricted or narrow legal training.
Arguably, such training is to some degree as appropriate to a school of
business or organizational management, or to a school of policy stud-
ies, as it is to a law school. It is especially relevant, however, that sub-
stantial numbers of lawyers are frequently cast in the position of being
governmental and business leaders. This occurs at the community, re-
gional, national, and international level, in both private and public en-
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terprise. Lawyers' education should prepare them for the task.
Lawyers may have an advantage and be especially well trained for
practical functions if their general preparation in terms of sound moral
disposition and a developed capacity to think is combined with the
broad scope of facility and knowledge of practical affairs as suggested
here.
D. Training in Matters of Personal Concern, Conscience and
Compassion
The "helping professions," social work, medicine, mental health, and
the religious pastorate, are mostly concerned with ministering to indi-
viduals, families, and small communities or sub-communities. The
problems characteristically relate to personal and social well-being, or
to a sense of personal and social well-being. The legal analogue is typi-
cally a concern with family relations and family economic security,
personal freedoms and deviant or criminal behavior, consumer protec-
tion and economic opportunity for the underprivileged and unpro-
tected, and the like. Some of the most fundamental values concerning
the freedom and dignity of the individual, and of the individual in rela-
tion to society, are involved here. Not only matters of conscience, but
also of caring and compassion, are most relevant in these kinds of client
experience and personal transactions that engage the lawyer. He is
dealing with personal, as distinguished from impersonal or institu-
tional, clients. Ethical, emotional, simple economic, and social consid-
erations may predominate in value and interest for the client. These
may at times equal or be even more compelling than legal con-
siderations.
The lawyer, as a "helping professional," must be able to contemplate
client experience in highly personal terms. This may mean any or all of
the following: Understanding client motivation and emotional con-
duct, consciousness of the importance of ethical and moral attitudes
including a sense of justice, compassion toward and understanding of
the client's economic circumstances, identification with the client's in-
terest especially in the avoidance of domination or control by big busi-
ness or big government, and other terms of legal parameters, perceived
mostly in terms of personal and social welfare considerations. Equity
may play a larger role than law, and a necessary part of the lawyer's
skill may be in knowledge of and experience in dealing with and per-
haps overcoming insensitive or unrepresentative law. Problem solu-
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tions may be primarily of an economic, social, or psychological
character, with the lawyer often helping in a more general nonlegalistic
role. At other times, though, the lawyer's competence in advocacy and
in invoking the rules and procedures of law is clearly most important.
As intellectual analysis may be the hallmark of elitist lawyers, and
legal and economic analysis the work of lawyers dealing with more
general and practical affairs, a capacity for empathy and counseling
skill may be especially important to those lawyers who attend personal
clients and are notably concerned with "caring, conscience, and com-
passion." The practice of counseling and the teaching of counseling
skill focus especially on (1) developing meaningful personal relations
and empathic and effective personal communication, (2) compre-
hending problems in terms of the client's subjective state as well as in
terms of objective facts, circumstances, and rules, (3) using analysis
that stresses social and psychological considerations, and (4) coming to
a resolution that focuses strongly on client need and satisfaction. Prob-
ing intellectual inquiry and complex economic, political, and legal
analysis are beyond the needs of typical clients and client problems
where personal and family affairs, as well as personal and community
well-being, are most often the issue. If he sees his role clearly, the law-
yer is minister to intimate needs and strong personal feelings. The ob-
jective characterization of problems may be in terms of landlord-tenant
relations, divorce, burdensome regulation, criminal prosecution, home
purchase, sales contracts, will preparation, small business organization,
and the like. The lawyer is not dealing so much with complex legal or
economic considerations as with limited resources and often complex
social, psychological, and political matters.
The teaching-learning model that best suits the goal of cultivating
the humane skills is one oriented to a clinic and clinical legal experi-
ence. Clinical legal education is, or ought to be, very strongly client
focused and socially concerned. In practice, it has mostly lacked a con-
ceptual framework for thorough inquiry into personal life experience
and for systematic exploration of the political, ethical, psychological,
social, and economic dimensions of personal experience. It has tended
to be excessively litigation oriented.
The law school can assist in providing and sustaining the requisite
sensitivities, attitudes, and skills for a practice in humane concerns by
providing an emotionally and ethically sensitive human learning envi-
ronment and emphasizing training in practice skills. It can also pro-
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vide substantive focus on the psychological, social, and moral, as well
as legal, dimensions of experience. Shaffer, in his term as dean at No-
tre Dame Law School, experimented with "human environments" in
legal education.66 He sought to adapt the Rogerian tenets of human
relations-unconditional positive regard, empathy, and congruence 6 7-
to the institutional environment in an advertent and self-conscious
manner. He stressed collaborative enterprise, and democratized both
teacher-student relationships and rules of governance that reflect pri-
mary concern with and about persons and personal well-being. This is
a difficult undertaking in a conventional law school dominated by the
tradition of dialectical inquiry and almost exclusively committed to the
development of student intellect. Shaffer's effort represented a kind of
tampering with the structure of conventional legal education; much
more in the way of institutional planning may be required before a
humane disposition and tradition in legal education can develop.
The role of the teacher in "humanistic" legal education is itself min-
isterial. It provides example and support in the conduct of personal,
educational, and professional relations. In pedagogical terms the
teacher is often a supervisor68 and, with lesser emphasis, an instructor
or case collaborator. His combined emotional and intellectual sensitiv-
ity and skill help to direct and evaluate student experience with clients,
both in contrived and real life situations. His substantive analysis of
problems is geared as much toward generating moral and psychological
sensitivity as toward an intellectual understanding of economic, polit-
ical, legal, and other relevant concerns. Supervision may occur in one-
on-one relationships between teacher and student or in small groups;
thus, the appropriate climate and style for substantive learning may be
the seminar.
Client emphasis and counseling concerns best reflect the ambience,
value emphases, and issues that characterize or should characterize stu-
66. See Shaffer, Report of the Dean 1973-74, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 168 (1974); Shaffer,
Report of the Dean 1972-73, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 214 (1973); Shaffer, Report of the Dean 1971-
72, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 232 (1972); T. Shaffer, Report of the Dean 1974-75 (unpublished). See
also T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 39, at 209-29.
67. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
68. The discrete properties of supervision as a proper and effective form of teaching in
clinical legal education have been developed well by Professor Kenneth R. Kreiling of the Ver-
mont Law School in an unpublished manuscript titled Supervision in Skill-Oriented Fieldwork
Placement: A Primer for Supervisors. See also R. MOSHER & D. PURPEL, SUPERVISION (1972); C.
TOWLE, THE LEARNER IN EDUCATION FOR THE PROFESSIONS (1954); E. YOUNGHUSBAND, EDu-
CATION FOR SOCIAL WORK (1968).
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dent learning and professional practice in matters of caring, conscience,
and compassion. However, the skills of advocacy, and especially skills
in adversarial negotiation and litigation, are of considerable impor-
tance in the promotion and protection of client interests. This impor-
tance is fostered by the fact that conflict resolution through the courts
and government agencies requires these skills. The tradition of the
lawyer as a champion of rights best suits the advocacy and litigation
requirement. The skills of criminal and civil procedure, with their at-
tendant rules of evidence, and the requirements of agency practice,
must also be learned. They may be, and tend to be, learned formally in
classroom instruction and experientially through simulated and real
trial practice.
It is pertinent to note that skills training does not occur in a vacuum.
The training and learning of different skills is attended by a preference
for certain kinds of values and behavior. Advocacy training engenders
a preference for sharp thinking and decision, and is associated with
contentious and competitive attitudes and environments. Counseling
training tends to encourage more concern for feelings and personal ex-
perience and develops better in an environment that nurtures and em-
phasizes humane values. It may even be, as I have suggested
elsewhere,6 9 that some lawyers are better disposed and qualified to be
personal counselors, others to be negotiators, and still others to be liti-
gators. The implication is that advocacy training, within the primary
professional orientation of personal caring, conscience, and compas-
sion, needs to be circumscribed so that contentious and competitive in-
fluences do not affect the legal education, and subsequently, the client
serving processes. It is a discrete and specialized kind of training that is
perhaps most appropriate for those lawyers who may wish to be recog-
nized specially for their interest and competence in advocacy.
III. CONCLUSION
The recondite enterprise of legal education cannot be understood un-
less prevailing assumptions about educational purpose and methods
are recognized, and unless educational practices are related to profes-
sional functions and social needs. This may, and does, give rise to
challenge.
69. Redmount, Attorney Personalities and Some Psychological.Aspects of Legal Conmltation,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 972 (1961).
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In idealized terms, legal education serves the general purpose of its
students by confirming sound moral disposition and developing the ca-
pacity to think. Reflecting the differentiable roles of lawyers in society,
it also serves the specific purposes of training an intellectual and legal
elite, training lawyers to deal with practical affairs, and training in mat-
ters of personal concern, conscience, and compassion. The legal educa-
tion enterprise is, then, a complex enterprise that calls for differing
intellectual substance, pedagogical methodology, and character of
teacher-student relationships. These are geared to the different objec-
tives that the educational process is intended to serve and the different
roles that lawyers play. The common identity of the lawyer may be
suffused by differences in roles, values, skills, and attitudinal emphases.
In current reality terms, legal education is uniform in its focus on
developing student capacity to think in a particular style: to "think like
a lawyer." It is also single-minded in training an intellectual and legal
elite. It appears both to succeed and fail. It succeeds in the sense that it
meets an essentially narrow purpose. The challenge is to bring the edu-
cational process abreast of the current scope of the practice of law and
invest it with the attitudes, knowledge, skills, and teaching-learning re-
lationships that are essential to the development of lawyers who are
clearly competent for their separable tasks.
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